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Ferguson, John J., M.S. December 1999 Environmental Studies
Modifying Chevron’s Principle of Deference; Applying Daubert to the Agency Decision-Making 
Process. (56pp.)
Chair Person: Len Broberg
Agency decision-makers ought to be required to use high quality science when making 
decisions, particularly when those decisions determine how and the extent to which biodiversity 
will be managed and protected on our public lands. In other words, the standards by which 
agency decision-makers are measured ought to be raised. We can achieve this goal by requiring 
them: (1) to screen scientific evidence for reliability and relevance, and (2) to base their decisions 
on only and all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant.
The reliability and relevance standard was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court in that case 
stated that the trial courts must act as “gatekeepers.” Commensurate with this statement, the 
Court now requires trial court judges to screen scientific evidence for reliability and relevance. 
Thus, if scientific evidence does not withstand the trial courts’ scrutiny, it must be excluded and, 
hence, not considered by the jury.
Under the reliability prong, the Court articulated four criteria that courts are to consider when 
determining whether or not to admit scientific evidence, and they are: (1) testability/falsifiability;
(2) peer review and publication; (3) rate of error; and (4) general acceptance. Under the 
relevance prong, the Court stated that trial courts must find a “fit” between the issue in question, 
the facts of the case, and the proffered evidence. It also noted that a scientific theory that is 
uncertain should not be found irrelevant as most, if not all, scientific theories are to some degree 
uncertain.
Though the Daubert criteria were developed for trial courts to use, I suggest that courts also 
require that agency-decision makers act as “gatekeepers.” By doing so, the courts can provide a 
“check” on the agency decision-making process, ensuring that agency decisions are based on 
“high quality” science. The Daubert review will also ensure that the agency decision-makers 
meaningfully consider science that contradicts their view, as I suggest courts require that agencies 
consider all and only that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant. This second 
step will make sure that sciences such as Conservation Biology receive a “fair hearing” in the 
agency’s process.
The first hurdle to applying a Daubert review to the agency decision-making process is the 
United States Supreme Court case, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). In that case, the Court articulated the principle of agency deference. Specifically, the 
Court developed a two-prong test courts must apply when deciding whether an agency decision is 
consistent with the law. In the first prong, courts are to consider whether Congress directly 
addressed the issue in question. If it had, then courts must ensure that the agency complied with 
its mandate. If, however. Congress was silent on the issue in question, then courts, pursuant to 
the second step, are to defer to the agency decision, so long as it was reasonable.
Though it appears Chevron’s principle of deference conflicts with my suggested Daubert 
review, it does not. Rather, courts are not technically conducting statutory interpretation by 
requiring agency-decision makers to rely on “high quality” science. Even if one argues that 
courts would be conducting statutory interpretation, the courts are empowered under the 
“reasonable” requirement to apply a Daubert review to determine whether an agency decision 
comports with the law. In other words, its hard to imagine that when Congress delegated
It
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authority to make a complex scientific decision to the agency, that it also delegated authority to 
the agency to use unreliable or irrelevant scientific evidence when making that decision. 
Consistent with this notion, courts in such a case ought to find an agency decision to be 
unreasonable and require it to: (1) reconsider all and only that scientific evidence which is both 
reliable and relevant; and (2) to choose a methodology that is supported by such evidence.
In this paper, I apply a Daubert review to three court cases in the context o f environmental 
litigation and demonstrate how it can be conducted and why it is necessary. The strongest 
argument for raising the standards by which agencies make decisions is that oftentimes those 
decisions determine the fate of biological communities. Furthermore, many species are 
depending on us for their survival and the law requires agencies to protect such species and their 
habitat. The principle of agency deference, therefore, ought to be modified and a Daubert review 
conducted.
Ill
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a vast, roadless area o f  old growth where forest communities thrive, 
roam freely, and exchange precious genetic material. Then, imagine that same area 
crisscrossed with roads leading to campgrounds, clear-cuts, and mines. Small, isolated 
patches o f  old growth now float in a sea o f  altered land. Yet, also imagine that the United 
States Forest Service was charged with managing the old-growth forest, and that it 
permitted this fragmentation to occur because it had calculated how much habitat the old- 
growth dependent species needed to survive, that is, maintain minimum viable 
populations, and then preserved those amounts—but only those amounts. Indeed, the 
Forest Service's decision to provide for diversity through maintenance o f  small reserves 
could, at one time, have found support in science.'
Most biologists, however, now support the proposition that large reserves are 
preferable to small ones, as such a decision takes other environmental factors into 
consideration.^ For example, the microclimate on the edge o f  a forest patch is different 
than that o f the interior. Frequently it is “drier, brighter and more w i n d y . T h e  
vegetation responds to this change in climate and, oftentimes, the structure and 
composition o f the vegetation near the edge is markedly different than that of the interior 
and may not consist o f habitat suitable for those species the patch was set aside to 
protect."* Predators and invasive weeds also gain access through edges, further threatening
' See Daniel Simberloff and Lawrence G. Abele, Island Biogeography Theory and Conservation 
Practice, 191 SCIENCE 285-86(1976). See generally DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE 
DODO 457-545 (1997) (discussing the history and substance of the arguments for and against large 
reserves, also known as the single large or several small debate [SLOSS]).
‘ See Michael E. Soule & Daniel Simberloff, What Do Genetics and Ecology Tell Us About the Design 
of Nature Reserves?, 35 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 19, 32 (1986) (stating that nature reserves 
should be as large as possible) See also REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING 
NATION’S LEGACY. 140-42 (1994).
’ See NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 198:.
" See BURGESS AND SHAPRE, FOREST ISLAND DYNAMICS IN MAN-DOMINATED 
LANDSCAPES 67-95 (Springer-Verlag 1981).
I
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the viability o f forest communities inside.^ In fact, small, isolated forest patches cannot 
always maintain their functional integrity.^
Other problems occur, too. All else being equal, small patches usually contain 
smaller populations o f the species they were intended to protect than do larger ones. ’ 
Small populations are more vulnerable to extinction than large ones are, as several factors 
predispose small populations to extinction.^ In addition to patch size problems, biologists 
have begun to widely recognize the “fundamental need for populations o f many species 
to be connected in order to be viable.”  ̂ For instance, if  a single reserve is not able to 
support a long-term viable population o f a species with large area requirements, then 
connecting existing reserves with corridors o f suitable habitat may enable viable 
populations to form.'® After taking all o f  these additional environmental factors into 
consideration, conservation biologists offered this solution to counteract the effects o f 
habitat fragmentation: Create and connect lots o f  large reserves, as they will enable large 
populations to form and will provide a buffer against edge effects.
In many instances, however, the Forest Service fails to consider these additional 
environmental factors. The courts, nevertheless, will usually defer to the agency without
 ̂See NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 54, 203-04; Natural Areas Association, 
Compendium on Exotic Species. NATURAL AREAS JOURNAL (1993) (including 43 articles on the 
topic o f the invasion of exotics); Katrin Bohnlng-Gaese, Mark L. Taper, and James H. Brown, Are 
Declines in North American Insectivorous Songbirds Due to Causes on the Breeding Range?, 7 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 76-78 (1993).
* See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2, at 25.
 ̂See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles o f Consen’ation Biology As They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 
Chi-Kent L. Rev. 893, 900 (1994); see also Bruce A. Wilcox and Dennis D. Murphy, Conservation 
Strategy: The Effects o f Fragmentation on Extinction, 125 AMERICAN NATURALIST 879-887 
(1985).
* Mark L Schaffer, Minimum Population Sizes for Species Conservation, 31 BIOSCIENCE 31, 131 -34 
(1981); MICHAEL. E. SOULE, VIABLE POPULATION FOR CONSERVATION (1987). The most 
important factors that predispose small populations to extinction are: environmental variation and 
natural catastrophes, demographic stochasticity, genetic deterioration, metapopulation and dynamics. 
NOSS AND COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 60.
" NOSS AND COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 151.
Reed F. Noss and Larry D. Harris, Nodes, Networks, and MUM's: Preserving diversity at all 
scales. 10 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 299-309 ( 1986).
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ever determining whether or not the method selected to provide for diversity (i.e., 
choosing to maintain small reserves instead o f  large ones) was based on consideration o f 
all that scientific evidence which was both reliable and relevant. A court may even permit 
an agency to discard reliable and relevant evidence on the ground that uncertainty 
surrounds its application.”
The courts, however, must accept what scientists have for years-scientific uncertainty 
is a fundamental condition o f  science.'^ Until then, critically important scientific 
information will not be guaranteed a “fair hearing””  in the agency decision-making 
process. The challenge, then, for those individuals and groups committed to ensuring land 
management agencies are making informed scientific decisions, is to direct the courts 
focus away from scientific uncertainty and towards reliability and relevance.
In this article, I rely primarily upon the science o f conservation biology and its 
principles to demonstrate the importance and necessity for this shift in focus. I also 
explore various ways in which the legal system can accommodate conservation biology 
principles to ensure they are given a “fair hearing.” The issues discussed in this paper, 
however, apply not only to conservation biology, but also to those other scientific 
principles that exist now and that will inevitably emerge in the future. I f  such principles 
are reliable and relevant, they too should receive a “fair hearing.”
This article is divided into five parts, not including the introduction. In Part II, I 
discuss conservation biology's principles o f reserve design and management for target 
species. In Part III, I discuss the Supreme Court's decision in D m bert v. Merrell Dow  
Pharmaceuticals, IncJ'' and the factors courts are to consider when admitting scientific
" See generally Sierra Club v. Marita ("Marita II"), 46 F.3rd 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
DOUGLAS J. FUTUYAMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 163, 164 (1983).
” A hearing” is when an agency considers scientific evidence and meaningfully discusses its 
implications before making its decision.
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evidence. I also suggest a two-part Daubert review courts should conduct when 
reviewing an agency’s administrative record to determine whether the agency s decision 
comports with the law. In Part IV, I discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. V. Natural Resources Defense Council, /n c ,"  and argue that when questions o f 
scientific methodology arise, courts should apply the suggested two-step Daubert review 
to determine whether use o f a particular methodology is a reasonable interpretation o f  a 
statutory provision. In Part V, I argue that, in light o f  the National Forest Management 
Act's (NFMA) diversity requirement, courts should not defer to an agency's scientific 
assumptions until the court has satisfied itself, through use o f the two-part review, that 
they are reasonable. Finally, in Part VI, I argue that, pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA) “hard look” requirement, the courts should also 
conduct the two-part review to ensure agency compliance with this law.
The two-step Daubert review may be applicable in other areas o f  environmental law 
as well. But these three areas o f  law— Chevron, NFMA, and NEPA—should enable one to 
discern whether a Daubert review is necessary and whether a certain area provides a 
more compelling reason than another does for extending the review. It should also be 
noted that I have limited the scope o f my legal discussions, for the most part, to Supreme 
Court decisions and the Ninth Circuit Court o f Appeal's interpretation o f them.
II. CONSERVATION BIOLOGY PRINCIPLES
Before we walk through the forest o f laws, I will briefly review the history o f 
conservation biology as well as some o f its essential principles. To do so will give 
context and meaning to the discussions in Parts III through VI.
Conservation biology emerged in the I970's, and the unquestioned goal o f its
509 U.S. 579(1993). 
"467 U.S. 837(1984).
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members is to maintain biodiversity.'^ Its mission-oriented character'’ and the enlistment 
o f  not only biologists, but also “geographers, sociologists, economists, philosophers, 
lawyers, political scientists, educators, artists, and other professionals,” is what sets it 
apart from other sciences.'* Conservation biology's most striking feature, however, is that 
its theories combine a body o f statements about ecology and population genetics that help 
explain the biodiversity o f  ecosystems.'^
Wide acceptance o f conservation biology’s theories by the mid-1980's led to the 
formation o f the Society for Conservation Biology. Despite gaining acceptance into the 
scientific community, conservation biology's ecological principles have been continually 
tossed aside by agency decision makers—as easily as one would a stone. Indeed, its 
theories and principles do not always receive a “fair hearing” in the agency decision­
making process. Courts have supported this unfortunate result by not requiring that 
agencies, such as the Forest Service, either consider its principles—and the scientific 
evidence that supports them—or apply them.^° This result frequently occurs when 
questions o f scientific methodology arise.^'
Recall the example in the introduction where a large, undisturbed area o f  old
They define biodiversity as “the variety of life and its processes; it includes the variety of living 
organisms, the genetic differences among them, the communities and ecosystems in which they occur, 
and the ecological and evolutionary processes that keep them functioning, yet ever changing and 
adapting.” NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 389.
Believing that no science is value fi'ee, they contend that the greatest objectivity in science comes 
fi-om stating biases, values, interests, predilections, and goals up fi-ont. Noss, supra note 7, at 893. See 
also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 164 (1983) (stating that since “scientists can be just as biased, 
subjective, and foolish as anyone else, why should we have any belief in what they say? The answer: 
Scientists are motivated not only by a quest for knowledge but a quest for reputation, and there is no 
better way for a scientist to achieve reputation than to demolish existing ideas by finding contrary 
evidence, or to propose a theory that explains the evidence better”).
See Noss, supra note 7, at 895.
See Patricia S. King, Applying Daubert to the "Hard Look" Requirement o f NEPA: Scientific 
Evidence Before the Forest Service in Sierra Club v. Marita, 2 Wis. L. Rev, 147, 151(1995).
See generally Marita, 43 F.3d 606; Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest 
Service, 88 F.3rd 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); But see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
INCORPORATING BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ANALYSIS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1-2 (1993) (incorporates 
guiding principles of conservation biology into its recommendations for biodiversity considerations 
under NEPA).
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growth was reduced to small, isolated patches. The Forest Service in that instance 
decided that the method o f fragmenting the forest into small patches would preserve 
biological diversity better than the method o f creating lots o f large reserves. Recall also 
that these patches are essentially islands afloat in a sea o f  altered land, for this analogy 
led scientists to the theory o f island biogeography—developed from studies conducted for 
real islands^^—where they applied its predictions to forest patches on the mainland.^^
Most notably, scientists studying island biogeography developed: (1) the species-area 
curve, which states that the number o f  species within any given area is related to the size 
o f that area; and (2) the equilibrium theory, which states, among other things, that the 
number o f species living on an island depends on the island's size and its distance from 
sources (other islands or the mainland) o f  immigrants.^'*
Island biogeography is now a foundational discipline within conservation biology. In 
fact, conservation biologists have derived from the theory a number o f  reserve design 
principles and suggest that, if  forest managers apply them when designing forest reserves, 
they can give forest communities, such as old-growth ones, the opportunity to maintain 
viable populations—for one o f the greatest threats to biodiversity is habitat fragmentation.
Conservation biology principles directly address that threat.
Take, for example, conservation biology's principle that “large blocks o f  habitat, 
containing large populations o f  a target species, are superior to small blocks 
o f habitat containing small populations.” For years scientists debated the question o f
See generally. Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd 754; Marita, 43 F.3d 606.
See generally ROBERT H. MACARTHUR & EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE THEORY OF ISLAND 
BIOGEOGRAPHY (1963) (stating that "the same [island biogeography] principles apply, and will 
apply to an accelerating extent in the future, to formerly continuous natural habitats now being 
broken up by the encroachment of civilization). See also NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 
52 (discussing the differences between oceanic islands and terrestrial islands).
QUAMMEN, supra note 1, at 440.
See generally MACARTHUR and WILSON, supra note 23.
See BURGESS and SHARPE, supra note 4. See also Reed F. Noss, A Regional Landscape 
Approach to Maintain Diversity, 33 BIOSCIENCE 100-06. (1983); Wilcox and Murphy, supra note 7, 
at 879-887 (1985)
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whether the best way to maintain biodiversity was through protection o f a single large 
forest reserve or creation o f several small ones (SLOSS debate)/^ Scientists, who earlier 
were on opposing sides o f the debate, came to the consensus that the best way to 
promote biological diversity was by creating lots o f large forest reserves.^’ Hence, the 
“bigness” and ‘multiplicity” principles emerged?^ The Forest Service, however, 
oftentimes fails to consider or apply such principles when designing reserves. Rather, it 
continues to provide for diversity by converting large, undisturbed areas o f forest into 
small scattered ones, and courts regularly defer to the agency when these scientific 
methodology issues arise.^^
But conservation biologists are political, yet another aspect that distinguishes them 
from other scientists. Instead o f allowing its principles— and the scientific evidence 
supporting them— to fall to the wayside, conservation biologists continually promote 
their use. It is many o f these principles, referred to as “reserve design” principles, that 
courts are reluctant to require agencies to consider or apply. Listed below are some o f 
the essential ones.^®
(1) Species well distributed across their native range are less 
susceptible to extinction than species confined to small portions 
o f  their range—multiplicity principle;^"
(2) Large blocks o f  habitat, containing large populations o f  a target 
species, are superior to small blocks o f habitat containing small 
populations -bigness principle;
See generally QUAMMEN, supra note 1, at 457-545.
”  See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2, at 32.
Id.
See. e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita (“Marita I”), 843 F.Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D.Wis. 1994).
See Noss, supra note 7 at, 899-905. See also NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 141.
The more widely distributed a species, the more unlikely it will be to experience a 
catastrophe, disturbance, or other negative influence across its entire range at once. Thus, it can 
relocate to areas in its home range that have not been destroyed and from those réfugia, recolonize the 
areas where it has been eliminated. This rule corresponds to the “multiplicity principle.” See Noss, 
supra note 7, at 900.
This rule corresponds to the “bigness principle. It states that under similar conditions, a large 
population will be less vulnerable to extinction than a small one, as a large block of habitat will usually 
contain a larger population. Id. at 901.
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(3) Blocks o f habitat close together are better than blocks far apart;”
(4) Habitat in continuous blocks is better than fragmented habitat;”
(5) Interconnected blocks o f  habitat are better than isolated blocks; 
^̂ and
(6) Blocks o f habitat that are roadless or otherwise inaccessible to 
humans are better than roaded and accessible habitat blocks/^
Other forest reserve elements should be considered as well, such as core reserves and 
buffer zones.^^ Thus, a model reserve network would consist o f  lots o f large core 
reserves, connecting corridors or linkages, and multiple-use buffer zones (see fig. 1).
Matrix
FIGURE 1.
Outer Buffer
Reserve
Inter-Regional Corridor
This rule facilitates the exchange o f individuals between two patches that may not otherwise occur if 
a large barrier, such as a highway, were in the way. If enough interchange occurs, the two populations 
may unite into one large one, making it less vulnerable to extinction. Id. at 901.
” Fragmentation reduces the size o f the habitat and increases its isolation. The theory of island 
biogeography predicts that the small and isolated patch will have a smaller population than a large one 
and is less likely to be colonized or recolonized by target species after a disturbance, thereby increasing 
its chance of extinction from the area. Id. at 901-02.
” This rule states that habitats functionally connected (measured according to the potential for 
movement and population interchange o f target species) are less subject to extinctions, particularly 
when the corridor resembles that of the target species habitat Id. at 902-03.
Roads enable humans to access areas otherwise inaccessible, except on foot and lead to high 
mortality rates for certain species. Id. at 903.
”  See NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2, at 147-48 (stating that core reserves are the backbone 
of a regional reserve system, and defining a multiple use buffer zone as a zone that permits a greater 
range of human uses than core reserves but is still managed with native biodiversity as a preeminent 
concern. Because its allowable uses are less intense than in the general landscape matrix, the buffer 
zone should serve to shield or insulate core reserves from harmful activities. Without strictly protected 
areas representing most of a region's biodiversity, losses are inevitable).
8
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These reserve design principles are the best supported ones conservation biology 
has to offer.^* Yet, scientific principles, no matter how well supported, retain a 
probabilistic character. Though we may wish that probabilistic statements will 
eventually be replaced by firm declarations, it is evident that the more we learn about our 
ecosystems, “the more we recognize our profound i g n o r a n c e . T h u s ,  courts as well 
agency decision makers, lawyers, and legislators, must accept that science is inherently 
uncertain and instead seek to distinguish between those scientific theories and principles 
that contain indicia o f  reliability from those that do not.
III. DAUBERT: Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,^  ̂ set forth a 
two-prong test for courts to use when determining whether or not scientific evidence is 
admissible and ought to be considered by the jury. According to the Supreme Court, the 
trial judge's role is that o f  a “gatekeeper,” one who permits the jury to consider only that 
scientific evidence which has been screened for reliability and relevance.'*' The reliability 
criteria judges are to consider are: testability/falsifiability, peer review and publication, 
general acceptance, and rate o f  error."^ To be relevant, the evidence must be sufficiently 
tied to both the issue in question and the facts o f  the case."^ The Court characterized this 
link as “fit.”
Although these factors were developed for trial court judges to use when deciding 
whether scientific evidence is admissible in court, judges can practicably apply them to 
an administrative record review o f an agency decision as well.'*  ̂ Indeed, the agency 
could be placed in a position similar to that o f jurors. In other words, a reviewing court
David S. Wilcove and Dennis D. Murphy, The Spotted Owl Controversy and Conservation Biology.
5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 261 -62 ( 1991 ).
See Noss, supra note 7, at 908-09.
509 U.S, 579 (1993) (Daubert I).
Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 593-98. 
at 591.
See Patricia S. King, supra note 19, at 156.
9
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would ensure that the agency, in reaching its decision, considered all and only that 
scientific evidence which is reliable and relevant. The agency, however, would be free to 
choose among alternative courses o f  action, so long as each course met the minimum 
standard for admissibility. This suggested review will be discussed more in Section B o f 
this Part, and examples o f how to apply it will be provided in Parts IV through VI. But, 
for now, I will review the Daubert case and its two-prong analysis.
A. Daubert'. A Tw o-Prong Review
The primary issue in Daubert was whether the common law Frye test controlled the 
admission o f scientific evidence or whether the rules o f evidence had replaced it.'*̂  To be 
admissible under the Frye test, scientific evidence upon which expert testimony was 
based had to be generally accepted within the scientific community.'** Otherwise, the 
court would exclude it. It was unclear what the rules o f  evidence required.
In Daubert, two minor children claimed that the moming-sickness pill. Bénédictin, 
caused their birth defects."*’ To support their claim, the plaintiffs attempted to place an 
expert on the stand to testify as to a causal link."** The federal trial court, however, 
excluded the testimony o f their expert, finding that the scientific testimony linking 
Bénédictin to birth defects did not have general acceptance in the field to which it 
belonged."*^ The Ninth Circuit Court o f  Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling and granted 
summary judgment in favor o f  the defendant. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court 
and it granted certiorari to determine the proper standard for admitting expert testimony 
in a federal trial.
The Supreme Court interpreted the applicable rule o f evidence as requiring a flexible,
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 582.
«  Id. at 584.
10
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
two-pronged standard by which trial courts in the first prong assess the reliability o f the 
proffered evidence, and, in the second prong, its relevance/'' In doing so, the Court 
abandoned the Frye test. The evidentiary rule the Court relied upon s ta tes /'
If  scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
o f  fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form o f an opinion or otherwise, (emphasis added)
First, the Court found that when the drafters used the words “scientific” and 
“knowledge” together, they created a standard o f  evidentiary reliability and, hence, 
the first prong.^^ The Court then made it clear that “the [reliability] inquiry is a flexible 
one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 
that they generate”^̂  It then articulated four criteria, as noted above, that courts can 
apply when determining scientific reliability.
Second, the Court interpreted the language, “assist the trier o f  fact,” as establishing 
the second prong— relevance o f the proffered evidence.^'* Again, in order to establish 
relevance under this prong, a court must find that the appropriate “fit” exists between the 
testimony, the issue in question, and the facts o f the case.^^
The Court's decision made it clear that the wholesale exclusion under a general 
acceptance test was no longer appropriate.^^ Instead, a trial court judge must now act as 
a “gatekeeper” to ensure that all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both
Id. at 593-98. 
" Id. at S88.
”  Id. at 590 (finding that “the adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science,” and that the “word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.” In accordance with this evidentiary rule, the Court held that the “proposed 
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation, i.e., “good grounds” based on what is known.’ 
Thus “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific 
validity”).
”  Id. at 594.
^ Id. at 591. 
at 591.
Id. at 587.
11
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
reliable and relevant.^^ In other words, when faced with a proffer o f expert scientific 
testimony, the trial judge, in making the initial determination whether to admit the 
evidence, must determine (1) whether the expert's testimony reflects “scientific 
knowledge,” and (2) whether it will assist the trier o f  fact to understand or determine a 
material fact at issue/^
On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that the scientific evidence supporting the 
expert's assertion lacked general acceptance and had never been peer reviewed or 
published-except in the pages o f  federal and state reporters. Moreover, it found that the 
expert offered no tested or testable theory to explain the causal link between Bénédictin 
and birth defects, though even i f  the expert had, the court stated that it would not have 
been relevant. The expert's testimony would have shown that Bénédictin does not double 
the likelihood o f birth defects—as required by the court—and would, therefore, not prove 
causation. The court then excluded the expert's testimony,^’
Since then, the Ninth Circuit has reiterated that this Daubert duty requires the 
court to judge the reasoning used in forming an expert conclusion and not the conclusion 
itself. “  So, if  scientific testimony satisfies Daubert's two requirements,^' then it is a 
matter for the finder o f fact to decide what weight to accord such testimony.^^ For 
instance, “in arriving at a conclusion, the factfinder may be confronted with opposing 
experts, additional tests, experiments, and publications, all o f which may increase or 
lessen the value o f the expert's testimony. But their presence should not preclude the 
admission o f the expert's testimony—they go to the weight, not the admissibility.”^̂
1. DAUBERTS
To establish reliability under the first prong, a court should consider the following: 
at 592-93. "
Id. at 592; see also Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3rd 1226.1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (Daubert II), 43 F.3d at 1317-21(9th Cir. 1995).
“  See Collagen 161 F.3rd 1226, at 1230.
Id. at 1230-31.
Id. at 1230-31.
«/rf. at 1230-31.
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(1) testability,
(2) peer review and publication,
(3) known or potential rate o f error, and
(4) general acceptance.^"
The Ninth Circuit Court o f Appeals has repeatedly stated that a district court's inquiry under 
Daubert is a flexible one,^  ̂emphasizing that these factors are illustrative, not exhaustive.*’̂  
In other words, Daubert's standard for determining admissibility of scientific evidence does 
not require a trial court to use a strict “checklist” to determine suitability of testimony, and 
the court is not required to automatically exclude relevant evidence if one of the listed 
conditions is not fully satisfied.*^
VnàQX Daubert's reliability prong, a court should first consider whether a theory can 
be tested, that is, whether it generates falsifiable hypotheses,*’* for scientific knowledge 
progresses not by proving, but by disproving.*^ In fact, “this methodology is what 
distinguishes science from other fields o f human inquiry.”™ But what exactly is a theory? A 
theory emerges out of the following methodology. Alternative hypotheses are offered to 
explain a certain phenomenon. Each hypothesis is then rigorously tested and those that are 
disproved are eliminated. What is left is the best available explanation for a given 
phenomenon—the theory.’' In sum, theories are the facts of science, for facts are merely
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, See also Daubert JI, 43 F.3d at 1316.
See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Flight Intern, o f Florida Inc., 156 F.3rd 952 (9th Cir. 1998); Cabrera v.
Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d225, 228 
(9th Cir. 1997); Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996).
Daubert II. 43 F.3d at 1317.
Desrosier, 156 F.3d 952.
Daubert, 509 U.S at 593.
See King, supra note 19, at 150. See also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 167 (1983).
™ Daubert, 509 U.S at 593.
See King, supra note 19, at 150 (1995). See also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 169 (1983) (stating 
that "a scientific theory can be corroborated by observations that accord with its predictions, that can be 
falsified by observations or experiments which are incompatible with the theory, and that relies on 
objective observations that can be repeated by trained, unbiased observers).
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hypotheses that are well-supported by available evidence.’̂
To be falsifiable simply means that the theory “specifically predicts that certain 
observations, if made, would prove the theory w r o n g . F o r  example, if you stated that 
ghosts cause blindness in dogs, there would be no possible way for me to prove your 
theory wrong.’'* First, I would be unable to detect such ghosts. Second, if  they acted 
arbitrarily, I would be unable to make predictions about which dogs will or will not go 
b l i n d . I n d e e d ,  “the hallmark o f nonscientific theories is that they cannot be falsified.”’  ̂
Thus, one must “not demand that every scientific statement must have in fact been tested 
before it is accepted . . .  only demand that every such statement must be capable o f  being 
tested.””
The second consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication.’® Research that is accepted for publication in a reputable 
scientific journal after having been subjected to the rigors o f  peer review is a significant 
indication that other scientists take it seriously.’  ̂ In fact, the scientific community will 
reject a work for a number o f  reasons, including “insufficient data, erroneous methods, 
improper use o f statistics, [or] unwarranted deductions from the data.®° Moreover, the 
integrity o f this review process is guaranteed by, among other things, the simple fact that 
“every scientist's research depends on the research o f  others in the field; so out o f pure 
self-interest, every scientist scrutinizes the work o f others carefully, to be sure it is
” See FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 166. 
at 168.
KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 48 (Routledge 1992) (1959): see 
also King, supra note 19, at 150 (finding that the Forest Service's contention that diversity is a 
function of the diversity of habitats was circular and, therefore, could not generate a testable 
prediction).
Daubert I, 509 U.S. 593-94 (stating that it is relevant, though not dispositive. Rather it is a 
component because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected). 
See e.g., Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1228-29.
Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1318.
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reliable.”*'
In addition, the Ninth Circuit requires that publication occur in a generally- 
recognized scientific journal that conditions publication on a bona fide process o f peer 
review.*^ It does acknowledge, however, that well-grounded but innovative theories may 
not have been published and, thus, should not be excluded on this basis a lo n e .In s te a d , 
the fact o f  publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal is relevant to the 
reliability consideration, though not dispositive.*"
The third consideration is the known or potential rate o f error. This faetor is 
applicable to specific measurement techniques, such as voice identification techniques 
and polygraph tests. It may also be applicable to certain scientific protocols.*^ A high 
rate o f  error would indicate unreliability.
The final consideration is whether the theory or technique is generally accepted. As 
noted above, this was the sole consideration under the Frye test. Though wholesale 
exclusion under this test has been abandoned, widespread acceptance can be an 
important factor in ruling whether or not particular evidence is admissible,*® as a “known 
technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community 
may properly be viewed with skepticism.”*’ It should also be noted that a reliability 
assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification o f a relevant 
scientific community and an express determination o f  a particular degree o f acceptance
See King, supra note 19, at 152 (1995). See also FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 165.
FUTUYAMA, supra note 12, at 164.
Daubert //, 43 F.3d at 1318 n.6.
Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1228; Daubert I, 590 U.S. at 593.
Daubert /, 590 U.S. at 594. But see Lust, 89 F.3d at 597 (stating that if these guarantees of 
reliability are not satisfied, the expert 'must explain precisely how [she] went about reaching 
[her] conclusions and point to some objective source . . .  to show that [she has] followed the scientific 
method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in [her] field").
See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck Audubon Socy, 97 F.3rd 1161 (9th Cir. 1996).
“  See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d at 1418 (9th Cir. 1998).
Daubert 1, 590 U.S. at 594.
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within that community.**
2. DAUBERTS  SECOND PRONG
The second prong under Daubert requires a judge to ensure that the proposed expert 
testimony will “assist the trier o f  fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.” Thus, if  evidence is found to be reliable, but not relevant, it must be excluded.*^ 
Although the Court stated that the focus o f  a relevancy review must be solely on 
principles and methodology, and not on the conclusions that they generate,^® “nothing . .
. requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to the existing 
data only by the ipse dixit [arbitrary statement] o f the expert.” A court may conclude that 
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered.”®'
The Court in Daubert also acknowledged that scientific evidence is inherently 
uncertain and that, to be relevant, it need not be established to a high degree o f certainty. 
In fact, the Court stated “[i]t would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject o f 
scientific testimony must be 'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in 
science.”®̂ Expanding on this language, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[n]ot knowing the 
mechanism whereby a particular agent causes a particular effect is not always fatal to a 
plaintiffs claim. Causation can be proved even when we don't know precisely how the 
damage occurred [or will occur], if  there is sufficiently compelling proof that the agent 
must have caused [or will cause] the damage somehow.”®̂
B. TWO-STEP APPROACH: Agency Decision Making
Daubert's two steps would not be difficult for courts to apply when reviewing an 
agency's administrative record, as I will demonstrate in Parts IV through VI. Indeed, 
when questions o f scientific methodology arise in environmental cases, courts should not
See e.g., Desrosier, 156 F.3d 952.
U.S. V. Scholl 166 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1999); Daubert //, 43 F.3d at 1315.
Collagen ,161 F.3rd at 1228.
” Joiner v. General Electric Co., 522 U.S. 136 (1997). See also Collagen , 161 F.3rd at 1228 
Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1230; see also Daubert /, 509 U.S. at 590.
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automatically defer to the agency, as the method selected to achieve specific diversity 
goals may not be supported by scientifically reliable or relevant evidence. Unless courts 
conduct meaningful reviews o f these agency decisions, it will be difficult, if  not 
impossible, for them to ensure that agency decisions are consistent with legislative 
aims.^" Thus, the Daubert factors ought to guide courts in their analysis o f  the 
administrative record to ensure that agencies’ scientific decisions comport with the law 
and its underlying purposes.
When reviewing an agency's decision to see whether or not it is based on reliable 
and relevant scientific evidence, a court should ask these two questions that were first 
proposed by Patricia King.^^
(1) Is the evidence reliable?
If  it is, it should be considered by the agency. I f  not, it should not 
be considered.
(2) Did the agency consider all o f the reliable and relevant evidence 
presented to it before making a decision?
In answering the first question, a reviewing court should apply the Daubert criteria to 
determine whether the scientific evidence is reliable. The court must then ensure that the 
agency considered only and all that scientific evidence which is reliable and relevant.
This second step places a duty on agency decision-makers to make a good faith effort to 
diligently seek out all such evidence and ensures that the agency answers evidence that 
contradicts its views.®^
Note, too, that this two-step approach is not being proposed to force the agency to
Collagen, 161 F.3rd at 1228; see aha Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1314.
See generally Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the 
Environment, 63 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 209 (1987).
See King, supra note 19, at 156-57.
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adopt one scientific approach over another. Instead, it is being proposed to ensure that 
valid scientific principles, such as those o f  conservation biology, are given a 
“fair hearing.” If contradicting views withstand the two-step scrutiny and are properly 
considered, then the court should defer to the agency's choice o f how to proceed in light 
o f such evidence. By following this approach, the court can empower an agency to 
consistently make informed policy choices. This suggested two-part review is consistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron.
IV. Chevron: A Principle of Deference
In Chevron, the Supreme Court devised a two-step analytical approach for courts to 
follow when reviewing an agency's interpretation o f a statutory provision. In this part, I 
review that approach as well as the Ninth Circuit's interpretation o f it. Focusing on a 
recent Ninth Circuit case, I argue that a two-step Daubert review—when applied to 
questions o f  scientific methodology—is compatible with Chevron's principle o f 
deference. This principle states that an agency’s interpretation o f an ambiguous statutory 
provision it administers is entitled to deference, so long as it is reasonable.’’
The importance o f conducting a Daubert review in this context lies in the fact 
that when Congress passes an environmental statute and leaves an area ambiguous 
because o f its scientific complexity, it is delegating authority to the agency to make a 
policy choice. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Congress' delegation entitles the 
agency to use unreliable scientific evidence— where it would risk undermining the 
objectives a particular statute was enacted to achieve, such as protecting threatened 
species— when making that choice. Thus, a two-step Daubert review would serve as a 
check on the agency decision-making process to ensure that an agency's interpretation o f 
a statutory provision is truly reasonable and consistent with Congressional intent.
See id. at 157.
”  Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2105 
( 1990)(stating that the reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to the inquiry into 
whether the agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious with the meaning of the APA. That inquiry 
requires the agency to give a detailed explanation of its decision by reference to relevant factors).
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A. Chevron's Two-part Analytical Approach
The question for the Court in Chevron was whether the EPA's plantwide 
definition o f  “source” violated the Clean Air Act.’* Under this Act, the EPA was required 
to establish a permit program for “new or modified major stationary sources” o f  air 
pollution in “nonattainment” states.”  The EPA had defined “source” to mean any 
pollution-emitting device in a p l a n t . T h u s ,  if  a plant had twenty such devices, it would 
have to obtain a permit for each o f them. However, in 1981, the EPA revised its 
definition. A “source” under the new definition was not each individual device, rather 
it was the entire plant. So when a plant modified or installed a new device, a permit 
would be required only if  the amount o f pollution emitted by the entire facility increased. 
The EPA's new definition was termed the “bubble concept.” To decide whether the 
concept violated the Clean Air Act, the Court created and applied a two-part analytical 
approach for resolving issues o f statutory interpretation;
(1 ) Courts must ask whether Congress has directly addressed the precise
question at issue.'®^ If  Congress’ intent”’'' is clear, the court and agency
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
42 U.S.C. 7502(b)(6).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858.
See 40 C.F.R. 51.165(a)(!)(i)-(ii) (1989).
See Chevron, 467 U.S. 842-44.
See Conlan v. United States Dept, of Labor, 76 F.3d at 274 (9th Cir. 1996).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (stating that if  a court, employing traditional tools o f statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is 
the law and must be given effect). See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations o f  Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511,515 (1989): seg ako Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1309 
(quoting Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990)(a court can discern 
Congressional intent “by looking to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language 
and design of the statute as a whole’’); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, n.93 F.3d 610, 612 
(9th Cir. 1996) (stating that only if  the language and text are ambiguous, however, does the court 
consider statutory history); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan (Squirrel 11) 954 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9"" 
Cir. 1992)(stating that “[l[t is naïve, or disingenuous, to suggest that courts should not consider 
legislative history when attempting to determine the meaning of statutes’’).
Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1312. But see Rainsong Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 106 F.3d 269, 273 (9th Cir. 1996)(stating that the Court will accept an [agency's] 
interpretation only if it is compatible with Congress' clear intent as expressed by the plain meaning of 
the statute.); American Tunaboat Association v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1401,1408-09 (9th Cir. 1995)(stating 
that a court must “interpret language in one section o f a statute consistently with language o f other 
sections and with the purposes of the entire statute considered as a whole. In fact, the court will refrain 
from resorting to an unduly literal interpretation of a statutory provision when to do so would
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must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent o f  Congress.
(2) But if  Congress was silent or ambiguous as to the precise question at 
issue, then a court must determine if  the agency's interpretation is a 
reasonable'®^ one. If  it is, a court must defer.
Applying the two-step approach to the facts, the Court found that neither the statute 
nor its legislative history addressed the issue o f whether Congress intended “source” to 
mean the entire plant or each pollution-emitting device. The Court then asked whether 
the agency's “bubble concept” was a reasonable interpretation o f source,” and ultimately 
held that it was, for the agency's definition “represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation 
of manifestly competing interests.” '®'' In fact, the agency had provided for reasonable 
economic growth and served the environmental objective o f  controlling air pollution. Its 
interpretation was, therefore, entitled to deference.'®^ Chevron's principle o f deference 
was bom.
The Ninth Circuit, in interpreting Chevron, has declared that an agency's 
interpretation of a legislative delegation is entitled to deference,'®® particularly where 
that interpretation involves agency expertise."® The question for a court, however, is still 
whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible or reasonable construction 
o f the statute, even if it is not the best one," ' as “the judiciary is the final authority on
eviscerate the clear intent o f Congress); United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d I I70,1174 (9th Cir. 
1998)(stating that an interpretation that offends the statute's essential purpose will not be upheld). See 
also Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2092 (stating that the mere fact o f a plausible alternative view is 
insufficient to trigger the Chevron rule. No verbal formulation will be completely helpful here, relying 
as it must on undefined defining terms. But perhaps this will do: if the court has a firm conviction that 
the agency interpretation violates the statute, that interpretation must fail. This is so even If a 
reasonable person might accept the agency's view).
'“ See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 115 S.Ct. 
2407, 2416 (1995) (finding that the Act's text, legislative history and purpose supported the 
"reasonableness" of the Secretary's definition o f “harm”).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
Id.
Rainsong, 106 F.3rd at 272.
"'^McKittrick, 142 F.3d at 1175. But see 0 ‘Scanlin dissent (no need to resort to legislative history or 
“purpose” arguments when plain language answers the question).
Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1312; see also Pilchuck, 97 F.3rd at 1170 (9th Cir. 1996); Tunaboat, 
67 F 3rd at 1409 ( stating that courts must find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be
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issues o f statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are 
contrary to clear congressional intent and that frustrate the purposes o f  a statute.” ' This 
tension between deference and judicial duty is apparent in Northwest Forest Council v. 
PilchuckN^ Notably, the court in that case inquired into the reasonableness o f  the 
agency's interpretation before deferring to it.
B. Case In Point; Pilchuck
In Pilchuck, the court combined a Chevron analysis with a scientific 
methodology one. The court's opinion, therefore, lends itself well to the discussion o f 
whether a two-step Daubert review is consistent with Chevron's deference principle, 
particularly when questions o f  scientific methodology arise. It does not, however, 
explicitly involve conservation biology principles. Nevertheless, my intention is that we 
will look at the cases reviewed in this article through the lens o f one who understands the 
importance o f conservation biology's principles and is committed to ensuring they 
receive a “fair hearing.” The unquestioned goal o f conservation biology, however, is to 
maintain biodiversity, and this case most certainly addresses this issue, albeit through the 
identification o f one species' nesting habitat— the marbled murrelet.
At issue in Pilchuck was the 1995 Recission Act's (hereinafter “Act ) “known to 
be nesting” requirement, for the Act directs the secretaries o f  agriculture and the 
interior to expedite the award o f timber harvesting contracts previously authorized by the
imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general 
purposes that Congress manifested); Central Arizona Water Cons. Dist. v. United States Envtl. 
Protection Agency, 990 F.2d 1531,1541(9th Cir. 1993) (an agency's interpretation is entitled to 
deference if the agency's choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that 
were committed to the agency's care by the statute, if it appears from either the statute or legislative 
history that the accommodation is one that Congress would have sanctioned).
Forest Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9 (1984); see also 
Rainsong, 106 F,3rd at 277-73 (noting that “[rjeviewing courts . . . must not rubberstamp . . . 
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the 
congressional policy underlying a statute. A court may not, however, substitute its own construction of 
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the agency).
Pilchuk, 91 F.3"'at 1170.
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1989 Northwest Timber Compromise except in the following instances:"^
No sale unit shall be released or completed under this subsection if  any threatened 
or endangered bird species is known to be nesting  within the acreage that is the subject o f 
the sale unit, (emphasis added).
Because the Forest Service was aware that the marbled murrelet was present in its 
proposed sale areas, it was required to make a “known to be nesting’ determination."^ 
Under the Endangered Species Act, the Forest Service was also required to enter into 
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the effect o f the sales on 
the marbled m urrelet.'"  Eventually, the Forest Service concluded that further logging o f 
its seventy-seven sale areas would “jeopardize the continued existence” o f the marbled 
murrelet, as it was “known to be nesting” in these areas."* The Forest Service's 
conclusion was derived from application o f the “PSG Protocol," which enables biologists 
to determine whether or not a stand is a nesting one. Biologists identify nesting stands 
by:'"'
( 1 ) presence o f fecal ring or eggshell fragments;
(2) readily observing activity o f birds flying in, out or through 
the canopy; or
(3) readily observing birds circling directly over or under the 
canopy.
The plaintiff contended, however, that use o f the “PSG Protocol” was not a reasonable 
interpretation o f the “known to be nesting” requirement.'^" Rather, it argued that a 
determination o f  “nesting” was reasonable only if  there was physical evidence, such as
""M at 1164,
M at 1164-65. 
at 1168. 
"’ W. at 1167. 
'" M  at 1167. 
""M at 1169.
™ Id. atll68.
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eggshell fragments, fecal rings or dead chicks, present on or below a tree.'*'
To resolve the issue, the court applied Chevron’s two-step analytical approach 
and first looked at the plain language o f section 200 l(k) (2). It determined that the 
section did not require that a nest be “found.” Instead, the court interpreted the phrase 
“known to be nesting,” so as to allow a range o f nesting activity to be considered. 
Turning from a textual analysis to a legislative history one, the court found that the “PSG 
Protocol” was never mentioned in the Act and that Congress took no scientific testimony 
on the issue o f how to make a “known to be nesting determination.” '̂ "’ Acknowledging 
that the legislative history failed to address what “known to be nesting” meant, the court 
stated that “it is exactly this type o f [unclear or ambiguous] legislation, aimed at 
administrative agencies o f  government, for which Chevron requires deference to agency 
biologists' expertise.” '̂ ^
The issue for the Ninth Circuit, then, was whether the Forest Service's 
employment o f the “PSG Protocol” was a reasonable interpretation o f  the “known to be 
nesting” requirement.'^^ In making its determination, the court acknowledged that the 
“PSG Protocol” was “the generally accepted scientific methodology employed to 
determine whether marbled murrelets are located in, or making use of, a particular inland 
forested site for nesting purposes.” '^’ It also noted, among other things, that the agency's 
experts had found that no other reliable, scientifically accepted and tested method for 
identifying nest stands existed.'^* The court then stated that “the location and
'*' Id. at 1168. 
at 1169. 
M at 1169. 
'""M at 1167. 
M a t 1168. 
at 1169. 
'*"M at 1167. 
'**M at 1169. 
M  at 1170.
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determination o f  what birds are doing in which location is the type o f program that has to 
be designed and implemented by agency experts unless there is clear Congressional intent 
to the contrary.” '^’ It then concluded by declaring that the agency’s use o f the protocol 
was "a reasonable interpretation o f the statute.”
Pilchuck demonstrates that rather than deferring to an agency's interpretation o f a 
statutory provision, the court is willing to inquire into whether an agency's choice o f 
scientific methodology is based upon reliable scientific evidence. Because the evidence 
indicated the “PSG Protocol” was reliable, the court did not have to decide whether it 
would have been unreasonable to use a scientifically method that was not. But the court 
indicated it could.
C. Pilchuck and the Daubert Factors
Before concluding that the “PSG Protocol” was a reasonable interpretation o f  the 
“known to be nesting” requirement, the court considered all four o f  the Daubert factors. 
Though it did not explicitly state that it was doing so, the thrust o f the opinion was that 
the “PSG Protocol” was a scientifically reliable method for detecting marbled murrelet 
nesting stands and was, therefore, a reasonable interpretation under Chevron.
The following chart summarizes the scientific evidence before the court in Pilchuck 
and is an example o f how the court could have explicitly conducted a two-step Daubert 
review.
TWO-STEP DA UBERT REVIEW
The plaintiff and defendant differed in what factors they contended were important in 
making a “known to be nesting” determination. Because the court considered only 
evidence regarding the “PSG Protocol,” I will be unable to chart evidence regarding the
24
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plaintiffs contention. However, if  the court were to conduct a two-step Daubert review, 
it would review the evidence supporting both the plaintiffs and defendant's contentions.
FIRST STEP:
Whether the “PSG Protocol” is a reliable scientific method o f detecting nesting 
stands? If  it is, it should be considered by the agency. If  not, it should not be considered.
Whether the Northwest Forest Council's contention is a reliable scientific 
method of detecting nesting stands? If it is, it should be considered by the agency. If 
not, it should not be considered.
P lain tiffs Contention
Nesting stands can be determined 
only by physical evidence 
such as eggshell fragments 
fecal rings or dead chicks 
present on or below 
a tree.
Defendant’s Contention
Nesting stands can be determined 
by the number and character o f 
murrelet detections in a particular 
tree stand.
DA UBERT FACTORS
(A) TESTABILITY/FALSIBILITY: 
Plaintiff
The contention is falsifiable with 
the observation that a physical 
determination alone does not 
identify most nesting stands.
Defendant
The contention is falsifiable with 
the observation that the “PSG 
Protocol” does not distinguish 
nesting and breeding activities 
from mere presence in a particular 
stand o f trees.
The court also noted that agency 
biologists have tested the protocol 
and found it to be reliable.
(B) PEER REVIEW AND PUBLICATION 
Plaintiff Defendant
No inquiry The authors o f the protocol were 
appointed by the Pacific Seabird 
Group (PSG), a professional
Includes: detection of an active nest or recent nest by a fecal ring or eggshell fragments, the more 
readily observed activity o f birds flying in, out or through the canopy; or circling directly over or under 
the canopy.
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(C) GENERAL ACCEPTANCE
scientific organization which takes 
a lead role in coordinating and 
promoting research on marbled 
m urrelet.’̂ ’
Plaintiff
No inquiry
Defendant
Court stated that this protocol is 
the generally accepted scientific 
methodology employed to determine 
whether marbled murrelet are located in, 
or making use of, a particular inland 
forested site for nesting purposes.
Court also noted: (1) survey data collected 
pursuant to the protocol was considered 
the best available scientific information 
upon which to base a determination of 
whether murrelets were known to be 
nesting in a sale unit; and (2)for the past 
five years, the FS and the FWS and 
independent scientists have accepted the 
“occupancy” determination under the PSG 
protocol as the criterion for establishing 
nesting use o f forested stands.'^'*
(D) RATE OF ERROR
Plaintiff 
No inquiry
Defendant
Evidence in the record indicates that the 
determinations under the protocol are 95- 
100% accurate in predicting nesting 
behavior.
SECOND STEP
Did the agency consider all o f the reliable and relevant evidence presented 
to it before making a decision.
(A) RELEVANCE:
Pilchuck. 97 F.3dat 1167 n.l. 
''-M at 1167.
‘--'M at 1169. 
at 1169.
M  at 1169.
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The “PSG protocol” is sufficiently tied to the issue in question and the 
facts o f the case, as it was designed particularly for locating marbled 
murrelet nesting sites.
m i CONSIDERED ALL AND ONLY RELIABLE AND RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE:
The court noted that the “PSG Protocol” was the only scientifically tested 
and reliable method for determining nesting stands. Thus the Forest 
Service in this case would not have been required to consider other 
methods.
In Pilchuck, the Forest Service employed a scientific methodology that would 
likely withstand scrutiny under a two-step Daubert review. The first criterion o f 
reliability under Daubert is testability or falsifiability. The Forest Service’s contention 
was that marbled murrelet nesting stands could be located by the number and character o f 
murrelet detections in a particular tree stand. This contention generated predictions that 
could be falsified if  certain observations were made.
For instance, a scientist could demonstrate that the protocol's predictions were 
incorrect by showing that the presence o f fecal rings or eggshell fragments, the activity o f 
birds flying in, out or through the canopy, and birds circling directly over or under the 
canopy, does not distinguish a murrelet nesting stand from mere presence. Yet, no such 
showing was made. Rather, the court found that biologists had tested the predictions “in 
developing the protocol, [and had analyzed] various types o f  murrelet behavior to 
distinguish nesting and breeding activities from mere presence in a particular stand o f 
trees,” and found it to be reliable. The plaintiff also generated predictions that could be 
tested and would withstand scrutiny under the first criterion, though no more inquiries 
into the plaintiffs contention were made.
The second criterion is peer review and publication. Here, the court noted that 
“the authors o f the protocol were appointed by the Pacific Seabird Group (PSG), a
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professional scientific organization which takes a lead role in coordinating and promoting 
research on marbled murrelet.” ' B y  acknowledging this fact, the court implied that the 
author's work was reliable. For instance, the authors were appointed by a legitimate 
professional organization. Credibility o f  such organization depends, in large part, on the 
credibility o f  the scientists it employs and the integrity o f  their scientific research. In 
order to maintain a reputation as a leader in marbled murrelet research, it would be in the 
best interest o f  the organization to ensure that these scientists produce high quality work, 
which can be achieved through a peer review process that scrutinizes their work for 
substantive flaws. A court, however, ought to inquire into whether such a process in fact 
exists and then examine the standards that guide it. Even if  a bona fide peer review 
process were in place, a court ought to also consider whether the findings were published.
Publication is an important element o f  peer review .'”  Thus, if  the authors o f  the “PSG 
Protocol” had not published their findings in a reputable scientific journal, a court ought 
to ask why, as an author's “readiness to publish and be damned” is the ultimate test o f 
scientific i n t e g r i t y . T h e  Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that well-grounded 
but innovative theories may not have been published and should not be excluded on this 
basis a lone ,pa r t i cu l a r ly  if  a bona fide process o f peer review was in place.
If  neither peer review nor publication were present, however, the Ninth
Circuit would require the “PSG Protocol's” authors to precisely explain how they went 
about reaching their conclusions and would require them to point to some objective 
source to show they had followed the scientific method as it is practiced by at least a 
recognized minority o f  scientists. Though peer review and publication are relevant to
M at 1167 n.l.
' Daubert I, 509 U.S. at 593.
Daubert F.3d at 1318.
7,509 U.S. at 593.
Lust, F.3d at 597.
Daubert I, 5QZ U.S. at 594.
Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1167.
Id. at 1169.
""W. at 1169.
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the reliability consideration, they are not dispositive.'^' A court must use its informed 
discretion when deciding the correct weight to assign the existence o f peer review and 
publication (or lack thereof) and should use the other Daubert factors to help guide it in 
its reliability determination.
The third criterion is general acceptance. The court explicitly recognized the agency's 
satisfaction o f this criterion, as it stated that “this protocol is the generally accepted 
scientific methodology employed to determine whether marbled murrelet are located in, 
or making use of, a particular inland forested site for nesting purposes.” '"*̂ It also noted 
that for the past five years, the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and 
independent scientists have accepted the “occupancy” detennination under the “PSG 
Protocol” as the criterion for establishing nesting use o f  forested stands.'"^ The protocol 
gained widespread acceptance in the scientific community to which it belonged and, 
therefore, would satisfy the third criterion.
The final criterion is rate o f error. The court noted that "evidence in the record 
indicates that the determinations under the protocol are 95-100% accurate in predicting 
nesting behavior.” ''”  The Supreme Court recognized this criteria would be most useful 
for techniques such as polygraph testing, though it is relevant to the protocol as well, 
particularly since such data could be collected. The rate o f error is low and, thus, the 
protocol could satisfy this criterion as well.
The “PSG Protocol” would likely withstand scrutiny under the first step o f a 
Daubert review. Under my proposal, however, the court would have also inquired into 
whether the plaintiffs suggested methodology was reliable and whether the Forest 
Service had considered other reliable and relevant methods for determining nesting 
stands. This determination is important because it would enable the court to determine, in
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the second step, whether the Forest Service meaningfully considered all such evidence. 
Without doing so, an agency would not be required to answer evidence that contradicted 
its view and the court could not be assured that the agency's choice was, in fact, 
reasonable. In this case, the court acknowledged that “no other reliable scientifically 
accepted and tested method for identifying nest stands” existed."*^ Thus, the Forest 
Service's decision would likely stand.
D. Other Interpretive Principles Displace Chevron.
Pilchuck is an example o f where, in the environmental field. Congress is faced with a 
complex scientific issue that is beyond its competence, and instead o f prescribing a 
particular method. Congress left that decision to the expert, i.e., the Forest Service. Under 
Chevron, so long as the method employed is a reasonable interpretation o f  a statutory 
provision, a court ought to defer to it. But when such an interpretation involves the choice 
o f one scientific methodology over another, the court should conduct a two-step Daubert 
review to determine its reasonableness. If  the agency fails this review, then the court 
should find that the agency's interpretation is unreasonable and require it to: (1) re­
consider all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant; and (2) to choose 
a methodology that is supported by such evidence. In the event that no alternative meets 
the Daubert reliability criteria, a court should prevent the agency from acting until a 
course o f action is supported by scientific evidence that meets Daubert's minimum 
standards.
The constitutional principle o f  separation o f powers is not an obstacle to such a 
review, even though when Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute, the resolution o f
Id. at 1169.
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that issue involves a policy c h o i c e . T h e s e  choices generally are to be made by the 
political branches, not the courts. Yet, courts can consider policy choices. In interpreting 
a statute, courts are empowered to employ the “traditional tools o f  statutory 
construction.” These tools include text, legislative history, and consideration o f policy 
consequences.’'*̂ In order to prevent irrational or absurd consequences, a court must be 
able to consider policy.’'** Courts, therefore, are not required to defer to agencies on such 
issues because they lack “constitutional competence to consider and evaluate policy.” ’'*̂
Rather, courts defer to an agency’s choice, or ought to, because to do otherwise would 
put the court in a position o f selecting an alternative that is “better” than another one that 
is also possible.’’” But that is not what I am suggesting. Instead, courts should ensure that 
the policy choice the agency does make is based on consideration o f all and only that 
scientific evidence which is reliable and relevant. The agency would make the ultimate 
choice. In fact, this suggestion is entirely consistent with Chevron, as courts would not 
technically be interpreting statutory provisions by conducting a two-step Daubert review. 
Rather, they would simply be requiring agencies to use reliable and relevant evidence. 
However, even if one were to argue that such a requirement does involve statutory 
interpretation and is restricted by Chevron's principle o f  deference, my suggestion finds 
support in a number o f  areas.
For example, other interpretive norms may require that a court reject an agency's 
position, even if Congressional intent is unclear.’” For instance, norms designed to
See Laurence H. Silberman, "Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy," 38 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 821(1989) (policy is a "definite course or method o f action selected [as by a government, 
institution, group, or individual] from among alternatives . . .  to guide and usually determine present 
and future decisions); See generally Glicksman, supra note 94.
See Scalia, supra note 104 at 515.
*'** See id.', see also Diarmuid F. O'Scanlin, Current Trends in Judicial Review o f  Environmental 
Agency Action, 27 Envt'l L. 1 (1997); see generally Sunstein, supra note 97.
See Scalia, supra note 104 at 515; see also O'Scanlin, supra note 148; see Sunstein. supra note 
97.
See Scalia, supra note 104 at 515.
’ ”  See Sunstein, supra note 97 at 2116-18 (1990).
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counteract administrative or governmental bias, to protect legislative processes, and to 
prevent regulatory irrationality may lead to the displacement of Chevron.' '̂" The issue then 
becomes whether Chevron will “displace or be displaced” by these other interpretative 
norms.
First, interpretative norms used to counteract bias are intended to remedy “systemic 
biases in governmental processes . . .  and to promote fair dealing.” These norms can 
displace Chevron. Consider the following: in the late 1960's and 1970's, citizens were validly 
concerned that the agencies were “captured” by the industries they were entrusted to 
regulate.'^'* In fact, that “capture” prevented agencies from placing importance on 
environmental protection.'^^ Today, that concern is more tempered because of the enormous 
pressure environmental groups have placed on agencies to foeus not only on industry needs, 
but on managing for healthy ecosystems.
Yet, when the Forest Service designs a plan to preserve biodiversity but fails to 
consider all and only reliable and relevant scientific evidence when devising the plan—resting 
its ultimate decision on unreliable evidence and allowing large amounts of timber to be 
removed— a court ought to view that decision with skepticism. In fact, that situation 
implicates the bias norm.'”  A court ought to, therefore, conduct a two-step Daubert review 
to ensure the decision was not biased, for allowing an agency interpretation to overcome this
M  at 2114-19 {\99Q).
M at 2115-16 (1990).
See E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-48 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Diver, 
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1981)
(describing a 'chorus of disaffection' in the late 1960's to the 'rank favoritism or obsequiousness 
that dominated many agency decisions); Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Government Planning: 
Judicial Review and Policy Formulation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 343 (1966) (Bureaucratic 
specialization leads to parochialism, excessive preoccupation o f the agency with its own goals and 
its own vision of the public interest, and a disproportionate sacrifice o f other social and economic 
interests to those it feels itself commissioned to protect and foster).
See Diver, supra note 154 at 408-09 (1981).
See generally Marita II, 46 F.3rd 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
Sunstein, supra note 97 at 2102 (1990) (stating that the "expression of these views is 
unlikely to be part of the exercise of authority that has been Congressionally granted. In these cases, an 
agency s claim of unmunity from the judiciary could not easily be seen as part o f its delegated 
authority).
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norm would be an odd result and a poor reading of congressional instructions.
Second, norms designed to protect legislative processes in order to increase 
rationality and integrity in that process'^ can displace Chevron. Yet, when agency expertise 
is at issue, Chevron will often overcome this norm. But it should not overcome it when a 
court is reviewing an agency decision to see whether that decision is consistent with likely 
interpretative instructions from the legislature.'”  It is difficult to imagine that when 
Congress passes an environmental statute and leaves an area ambiguous because of its 
scientific complexity, that it is delegating authority to the agency to use unreliable scientific 
evidence to interpret its instructions. It is also difficult to imagine that “this choice represents 
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care 
by the statute.”"’" Thus, in such a case. Chevron should be displaced and a two-step Daubert 
review conducted.
Finally, norms designed to counteract absurd or unjust results can displace 
Chevron.'^' Yet, in order for this result to occur, the “absurdity or irrationality” should be 
something so obvious that reasonable people could not differ. Again, it is hard to find a 
more patently unreasonable interpretation of a statutory provision than one where an agency 
discards reliable scientific evidence and employs a scientific methodology based on 
unreliable evidence. In such a case, this norm should displace Chevron.
So when statutes, such as the Recission Act, mandate that the Forest Service prevent 
a particular environmental result—such as jeopardizing a species listed under the ESA—it 
would be prudent for courts to satisfy themselves that the scientific methodology employed 
is based on consideration o f  all and only that scientific evidence which is reliable and
at 2116 (1990).
'” /J. at 2115-16 (1990).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2117-18.
M  at 2118 (1990).
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relevant. Without this review, courts will neglect their responsibility’“ to ensure that an 
agency's interpretation o f a statutory provision is consistent both with legislative aims 
and with Chevron's reasonableness requirement, thereby enabling the agency to make 
important scientific methodology choices that are exempt from judicial review.
V. Reasonable Assumptions
In this part, I examine whether a court should use a two-step Daubert review to 
guide them in their analysis o f  the administrative record when plaintiffs challenge the 
assumptions underlying an agency's decision to employ a particular scientific 
methodology. Specifically, I will review the case Inland Empire Public lands v. United 
States Forest Service, where the Forest Service conducted only a habitat analysis—rather 
than gathering population data on species and considering conservation biology 
principles-to discharge its NFMA diversity duty.'“
Similar to the example in the introduction, the Forest Service in Inland Empire 
determined how much habitat a species needed to remain viable and proceeded to protect 
only those amounts. Indeed, the Forest Service's methodology necessarily assumed that 
maintaining an acreage o f habitat greater than that which is necessary for survival would
See Rainsong, supra note 112 at 273; see also Tunaboat, supra note 111, at 1409; Forest 
Guardians, 131 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9 (1984))(stating that “the judiciary 
is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions 
which are contrary to clear Congressional intent and that frustrate the purposes o f a statute”).
Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd 754; The NFMA directs the Secretary o f Agriculture in preparing a forest 
management plan to: provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability and 
capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives of a land 
management plan adopted pursuant to this section, provide, where appropriate, to the degree 
practicable, for steps to be taken to preserve the diversity of tree species similar to that in the region 
controlled by the plan. See also Charles F. Wilkinson and FI. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource 
Planning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev 1, 296 (1985). As esteemed Professor Wilkinson 
stated, “it is difficult to discern any concrete legal standards from [the] plain language. But “when the 
section is read in light of the historical context and overall purposes of the NFMA, as well as the 
legislative history of the section, it is evident that section 6(g)(3)(B) requires Forest Service planners to 
treat the wildlife resource as a controlling, co-equal factor in forest management and, in particular, as a 
substantive limitation on timber production.”
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in fact assure a specie’s s u r v i v a l . I  suggest that plaintiffs specifically challenge 
assumptions such as this one and argue, for the scientific reasons discussed in Part II, that 
they are not reasonable. A court should then conduct a two-step Daubert review to 
determine whether the assumption is in fact reasonable, as the “service is entitled to rely 
on reasonable assumptions in its environmental a n a l y s e s , n o t  unreasonable ones.
One should realize that this challenge may not trigger the “hard look” doctrine, as 
that arises under NEPA. Often, though, plaintiffs bring both a “hard look” challenge and 
a NFMA diversity one. This combined approach, however, will be discussed in part VI.
A. Case In Point: Inland Empire
Similar to in Pilchuck, conservation biology principles are not explicitly mentioned in 
Inland Empire. Yet, one can again review the case through the lens o f a conservation 
biologist, as the case debates what type o f data must be gathered in order to provide for 
and maintain biodiversity.
In Inland Empire, the question for the court was what type o f population viability 
analyses was the Forest Service required to c o n d u c t . I n  other words, could the Forest 
Service discharge its diversity duty, embodied in regulation 219.19, through habitat 
analysis alone. The environmental plaintiffs contended that it could not.'*’* They argued 
that, in addition to a habitat analysis, the Forest Service was required to examine the 
species' population size, their population trends, and their ability to interact with other groups 
of the species living in neighboring patches of f o r e s t . Be c a u se  it did not conduct such an 
analysis, the plaintiffs argued, the Forest Service violated the NFMA.
The Forest Service, on the other hand, argued that it could discharge its substantive
Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd at 761 (9th Cir. 1996).
'^M a( 761.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 760.
M  at 760.
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duty solely through habitat analyses, relying on the assumption that maintaining more 
acreage o f habitat than is necessary for survival would in fact assure a specie’s survival.’™ 
The Forest Service conducted the following habitat analysis:'^’
(1) consulted field studies that disclosed how many acres of territory an 
individual of each species needed to survive and the percentage of that 
acreage that was used for nesting, feeding, and denning, etc.;
(2) assumed that these percentages would hold true regardless of the size of 
the individual's territory;
(3) examined each proposed alternative to see how many acres o f each type 
of relevant habitat would remain after the timber was harvested;
(4) determined what percentage of the decision area that the remaining 
types o f habitat constituted;
(5) concluded that a species would remain viable as long as the threshold 
percentage o f each type of habitat remaining in the chosen alternative was 
greater than the percentage required for that species to survive.
Its analysis, however, included no discussion of conservation biology principles, despite 
the voluminous peer-reviewed and published articles, acceptance into the scientific 
community, and testability o f its theories. As suggested in Part II, an agency charged with 
maintaining biodiversity on public lands ought to consider these principles when designing 
forest reserves. Moreover, it did not even include an analysis o f actual population data. 
Plaintiffs in Inland Empire argued that, at the very least, NFMA's diversity regulation 
required that population data be gathered on Management Indicator Species (MISs) and be 
used to measure the impact of habitat changes on the forest's diversity.
To answer the question o f whether NFMA's diversity provision requires actual 
population data for a diversity analysis, the court in Inland Empire looked to the plain
™ Id. at 761. 
M  at 760.
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language of the NFMA's implementing regulation, which states:
Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of 
existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area. For 
planning purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has estimated 
numbers and distribution or reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence 
is well distributed in the planning area. In order to insure that viable populations will 
be maintained, habitat must be provided to support, at least, a minimum number of 
reproductive individuals and that habitat must be well distributed so that those 
individuals can interact with others in the planning area. 36 C.F.R. 219.19 (emphasis 
added).
The court, implicitly applying a two-step analytical approach similar to that of Chevron, 
stated that "[w]e start, as we must, with the plain language of the Regulation.” ' I f  the 
regulatory "language . . .  is unambiguous, and its literal application does not conflict with the 
intentions o f its drafters, the plain meaning should p r e v a i l . I f  it is ambiguous and unclear, 
then the court reviews the agency's interpretation of its own regulations solely to see whether 
that interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.”
Under this standard, courts consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of 
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error o f j u d g m e n t . I n  other words, 
an agency's interpretation o f its own regulations controls unless “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”’’*̂ “This is especially true when questions of scientific 
methodology are involved.” '”  Likewise, “an agency is entitled to rely on reasonable
M  at 761.
Id. at 761 (citing Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner o f Internal Revenue, 997 F.2d 1285,
1289 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, 137 P.3rd 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998).
Nevada Land Action Association v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3rd 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1993).
Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1993).
Cuddy, 137 P.3rd at 1376; see also Schultz, 992 F.2d at 981 (stating that a court is not qualified to 
resolve a dispute where it would have to decide that the views o f a plaintiffs experts 
have "more merit that those of a defendant’s. It will not second-guess methodological choices made 
by an agency in its area of expertise. Rather, it will defer to agency expertise on questions of 
methodology unless the agency has completely failed to address some factor, “consideration of 
which was essential to a duly informed decision . . . ”).
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assumptions in its environmental analyses.”’’*
Acknowledging the legal context in which to operate, the court stated that “[t]he 
Regulation specifically provides that the Forest Service may discharge its duties through 
habitat management as long as habitat [is] provided to support, at least, a minimum 
number o f reproductive individuals and that habitat [is] well distributed so that those 
individuals can interact with others in the planning area.””  ̂ The court then stated that the 
diversity regulation clearly requires a habitat analysis. But it found the regulation 
ambiguous as to whether the Forest Service was required to gather actual population data 
on MISs to be used to measure the impact o f  habitat changes. Thus, it moved to the 
second and deferential step, even though it could have resolved the issue before reaching 
this step and required the Forest Service to gather actual population data.’*"
Nevertheless, the court reviewed the Forest Service's interpretation o f 219.19 
solely to see whether the interpretation was “plainly erroneous” or “inconsistent” with its 
regulatory duty. To begin its analysis, the court stated that the “service is entitled to rely 
on reasonable assumptions in its environmental analyses.” '*’ It found the Service's
88 F.3rdat761.
See Sierra Club v. Martin. 168 F.3d 1. (11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was 
faced with a question strikingly similar to that in Inland: Was the Forest Service required to conduct a 
population analysis with actual population data, or was a habitat analysis sufficient to discharge its 
duty? The court considered not only the diversity regulation 219.19, but found the requirements in 
219.19(a)(6) and 219.26 applicable as well. When read together, the court could answer the question 
and dispose of the issue before reaching the deferential stage.
For instance, the court interpreted section 219(a)(6), which states that “[p]opulation trends o f the 
management indicator species will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes determined,” and 
reasoned that it “is implicit that population data must be collected before it can be monitored and its 
relationships determined.” It then interpreted section 219.26, which states:
Forest plaiming shall provide for the diversity o f plant and animal communities and 
tree species consistent with the overall multiple use objectives o f the platming area. Such 
diversity shall be considered throughout the planning process. Inventories shall include 
quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in terms o f its prior and present 
condition. 219.26
The court found that “219.26 requires that inventories o f quantitative data be used when evaluating 
the effect o f management alternatives on forest diversity,” and that before inventories can be evaluated, 
they have to be collected. The court then reasoned that “if 219.19(a)(6) mandates that MIS serve as the 
means through which to measure the Forest Plan's impact on diversity, then, taken together, the two 
regulations require the Forest Service to gather quantitative data on MIS and use it to measure the 
impact o f habitat changes on the forest’s diversity.” Interpreting the regulations in any other way would 
rob them of their meaning, and would be unacceptable.
Inland Empire, 88 .3rd at 761 (citing Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F.Supp 1317,1331 (E.D. Wis.
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assumption-maintaining more acreage o f  habitat than is necessary for survival would in 
fact assure a species’ survival-em inently r e a s o n a b l e . I n  fact, it stated that the 
Service's methodology reasonably ensured viable populations by requiring that the 
decision area contain a sufficient amount o f habitat and habitat types necessary for 
s u r v i v a l . T h e  court then held that the Forest Service’s interpretation was neither 
“plainly erroneous” nor “inconsistent.” It reached this conclusion, however, without 
inquiring into the reasonableness o f the Forest Se vice’s assumption, though for the 
reasons discussed in Part IV, section D, it should have.
B. Inland Empire and the Daubert Factors
This section is concerned with answering one question not addressed in Inland 
Empire: whether it is unreasonable to rely on assumptions that are based on scientific 
evidence that would not withstand a two-step Daubert review. Because the plaintiffs in 
the case argued that a habitat analysis was not sufficient to comply with the regulation 
219.19— rather than specifically challenging the assumption underlying the Forest 
Service’s methodology—this question was not specifically addressed and facts were not 
gathered.'*^ The plaintiffs, however, could have explicitly challenged the Forest Service’s 
assumption, arguing that it was unreasonable under a two-step Daubert review and, 
hence, the Forest Service’s reliance upon it violated 219.19. Because courts have not 
explicitly begun to apply such a review, it is understandable that the plaintiffs withheld 
this argument.
But consider the following scenario. Plaintiffs could have challenged the Forest 
Service’s assumption, arguing that the theories o f conservation biology undermine the 
scientific basis for it. The plaintiffs and defendants could have then supported their
1994); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin 14 F.3rd 1324, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1992).
Inland Empire, 88 F.3rd at 761.
M  at 761.
'" M  at 761.
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positions by pointing to scientific evidence developed in the administrative record. With 
such evidence in front o f them, a court could have applied the Daubert factors to 
determine whether each position had sufficient indicia o f  reliability. If they did, then the 
court should have deferred to the agency so long as it considered all and only reliable and 
relevant evidence presented to it.
If, however, the scientific evidence used to support one o f the parties’ positions 
was demonstrated to be unreliable, the court should ensure that it was not the one used by 
the agency as the basis for its assumption. If  it was, then the court should find the 
assumption unreasonable and, hence, a plainly erroneous or inconsistent interpretation o f 
its regulatory duty in violation o f the NFM A.‘®̂ It should then require the agency to: (1) 
reconsider all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant; and (2) to 
choose a methodology, from which its assumptions originate, that is supported by such 
evidence. Notably, this review still allows agencies to rely on reasonable assumptions, so 
long as they are based on consideration o f all that scientific evidence which is reliable 
and relevant.'®’
VI. Hard Look
In this final part, I argue that a court should use the two-step Daubert review to 
determine whether an agency took a “hard look” at the “foreseeable environmental 
consequences o f  its proposed action” '®® I use the case Sierra Club v. Marita’̂  ̂to
M at 761.
For discussions about assumptions see generally Marita I, 845 F.Supp 1317 (E.D. Wis. 1994); 
Greenpeace, 14 F.B"® 1324 (9'*' Cir. 1992); Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dept, of 
Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172 (9* Cir. 1982).
See King, supra note 19 at 157.
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for “every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C). NEPA requires the 
government to disclose and take a “hard look” at the foreseeable environmental consequences of its 
decision, and the reasonable alternatives to that decision. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.
21 (1976).
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demonstrate the importance o f this review, and I explore this argument in the context o f 
the NFMA’s forest planning requirements.
The NFMA takes a two-stage approach to forest planning. Under the first stage, 
“a team . . .  develops a proposed [Land Resource Management Plan] together with a draft 
and final EIS.” '^° Once the LRMP is approved, direct implementation o f the plan occurs 
at the second stage, where individual site-specific projects are proposed and assessed.'^' 
Site-specific projects must be consistent with the stage-one, forest-wide plan.'®^
Both stages, however, must comply with the NFMA's substantive requirements, such as 
the diversity one.'^^ Consequently, this forest planning framework enables 
environmental plaintiffs to make the following argument:
In developing a LRMP, the agency ignored conservation biology principles. 
By doing so, it failed to consider the plan's effect on biological diversity.
Without considering these principles, the agency could not have taken the 
requisite “hard look” at the foreseeable environmental consequences o f  its 
proposed action or conducted a proper diversity analysis. Thus the agency 
violated both NEPA's “hard look” requirement and the NFMA's diversity one.
As you can see, this argument weaves the NFMA diversity requirement into a “hard 
look” one, and it is NEPA's “hard look” doctrine that is the focus o f this section.
By passing NEPA, Congress committed federal agencies to protecting and promoting 
environmental quality. To ensure that commitment is kept, NEPA requires federal 
agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for "every recommendation 
or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality o f  the human environment.” ' '̂' The EIS requirement “serves
Marita II, 46 F.3rd 606 (7'" Cir. 1995).
Inland Empire 88 F.3rd at 757.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 757.
Cuddy, 137F.3rd at 1376.
42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C).
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NEPA's 'action-forcing' purposes” ’’  ̂ in two important ways; (1) by ensuring that the 
agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed 
information concerning significant environmental impacts; and (2) by guaranteeing that 
the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience so that it may also 
play a role in both the decision-making process and the implementation o f that 
decision.” ^
The Court has characterized the requirement that the agency have “detailed 
information” before it as requiring the agency to take a “hard look” '^’ at the foreseeable 
environmental consequences o f its proposed actions.” '^  The only role for a court, 
however, is to insure that the agency has in fact taken a “hard look.”’ ’̂ Notably, 
“[n]either the statute nor its legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute 
its judgment for that o f the agency as to the environmental consequences o f its actions. 
NEPA “merely prohibits uninformed— rather than unwise— agency action.” ”̂'
So, “when specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to 
rely on the reasonable opinions o f its own qualified experts even i f . . .  a court might find 
contrary views more persuasive In fact, “NEPA does not require [the court to] decide
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
Methow Valley 490 U.S. at 349.
Cuddy 137 F.3rd at 1376; see also iow e, 109 F.3rd 521; Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (when reviewing to see whether a LRMP satisfies NEPA's requirements, 
courts in the Ninth Circuit will employ a “rule of reason” to determine whether the EIS contains a 
“reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects o f probable environmental consequences. 
Under this standard, it must ensure that that the agency took a “hard look” at the environmental 
consequences of its proposed action).
Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350 (stating that simply by focusing the agency’s attention on the 
environmental consequences o f a proposed project, NEPA ensures that important effects will not be 
overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die 
otherwise cast).
Kleppe. 427 US. 390,410 n.21 (1976).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971); see also Schultz,
992 F.2d at 981 (quoting Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 
1985))(a court will not be placed in a position where it will have to decide that the views o f one party's 
experts have “more merit” than those of the other party's experts).
Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 351.
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 351 (1989).202
42
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
whether an [EIS] is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA 
require [a court] to resolve disagreements among various scientists as to methodology.” ®̂̂ 
Omission o f any meaningful consideration o f fundamental factors, however, precludes 
the type o f informed decision-making mandated by NEFA.^®'*
Acknowledging the agency's duty under the “hard look” doctrine, the Council on 
Environmental quality drafted regulations to prevent uninformed agency decision­
making. By doing so, it required that agencies rely on “high quality” science to 
understand ecological systems:
The information [in the NEPA documents, including the FIS] must be o f 
high quality. Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public 
scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA.
Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific 
integrity, o f  the discussion and analyses in environmental impact statements.^®^
In light o f these regulations, a court—pursuant to a “hard look” review—ought to 
evaluate the scientific evidence that was before the agency when it made its decision to 
ensure the accuracy and integrity o f such evidence. 1 suggest that a court employ a two- 
step Daubert review when making this evaluation. Thus, an agency would be allowed to 
consider only “high quality” science—science that has been screened for reliability and 
relevance—in reaching its decisions.
Conducting the review in this context would not be burdensome, for NEPA already 
requires the agency to supply the data necessary for such a review. For instance, NEPA 
requires that the public receive.the underlying environmental data from which Forest
™ Schultz, 992 F.2d at 981 (quoting Friends o f Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,
986 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1178.
-°MOCFR. 1500.1(b) (1994).
Methodology and Scientific Accuracy, 40 C.F.R. 1502.24 (1994); see also Thomas, 137 F.3rd 
at 1151 (stating that the importance of these regulations lies in the fact that accurate scientific 
analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA); 40
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Service experts derive their opinions/''^ h  also requires agencies to identify any 
methodologies used and to make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and other 
sources relied upon for conclusions used in any EIS statement^'* To demonstrate the 
necessity for a Daubert analysis in the context o f a “hard look” review, I will analyze the 
case Sierra Club v. Marita.
A. Case In Point: Sierra Club v. Marita
In Marita the plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service violated the NFMA and 
NEPA in developing management plans for two Wisconsin national forests.^®^
Specifically, they argued that NEPA's “hard look” requirement mandated consideration 
o f conservation biology principles and that NFMA's diversity requirement mandated 
application o f them /'"  Because the Forest Service disposed o f these principles without 
doing either, the plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service violated both a c ts /"  Ultimately, 
the court found for the defendants/'^
Though Marita was decided by the Seventh Circuit Court o f Appeals, the Ninth 
Circuit in Inland Empire cited it as persuasive authority for a very important proposition: 
Courts ought to defer to agencies on questions o f  scientific methodology. But should 
they?
Consider the following fact from Marita and the argument the Forest Service made. 
First, the Regional Forester approved LRMP's that specifically prescribed that managed 
and unmanaged old growth should “occur as scattered small areas across the 
F orest. .  Note that this prescription flies in the face o f the-bigger-the-better
C.F.R. 1500.1(b).
Thomas, 137 F.3rd at 1150.
Wat 1150; 40 C.F.R 1502.24.
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 614. 
at 614.
In other words, plaintiffs argued that diversity is not comprehensible solely through analysis 
of the numbers of plants and animals and the variety of species in a given area. Rather, diversity 
also requires an understanding o f the relationships between differing landscape patterns and 
among various habitats.
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 624.
See Marita 1, 843 F.Supp. at 1536.
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principle. Second, the Forest Service made this argument in support o f  its decision;
The-bigger-the-better principle was derived from studies in island 
biogeography. Because those studies were conducted on true islands and in the 
Pacific Northwest, it is not clear whether their predictions are relevant to 
Wisconsin forests, as our forests have a very different forest composition and 
structure. Moreover, island biogeography has never been tested in Wisconsin, so 
it is uncertain whether its predictions would hold true for Wisconsin's forests. 
Thus, we are not going to test conservation biology's theories at the expense o f 
other forest plan objectives.
The court agreed with the Forest Service, and reiterated the fact that the Forest Service 
had looked at the theory o f island biogeography as well as conservation biology's 
principle and found them both to be uncertain in application.^'^ The court also noted that 
the Forest Service had considered setting aside the large Diversity Management Areas 
(DMA's) the conservation biologists suggested were required to preserve biodiversity. It 
then agreed with the district court that the Forest Service was not required to set aside 
the DMA's or to address issues o f forest fragmentation^'* because the theory o f  island 
biogeography had not been shown applicable to Wisconsin's forests. Finally, it held that 
failing to directly address or consider the predictions o f  island biogeography—or the 
scientific evidence supporting the conservation biologists' principles—in its final analysis 
was not a violation of the “hard look” doctrine.^*’
In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished between uncertainty in application 
and uncertainty in theory. Citing Daubert, it acknowledged that arguably there are no 
certainties in science.^'* But it then stated that “however valid a general theory may be.
See generally Marita II, 46 F,3rd 606.
Id. at 620.
*'* Marita I, 843 F.Supp. at 1539.
A/an'ra II, 46 F.3rd at 621; see also Marita I, 843 F.Supp at 1540 (stating that the service did not 
directly consider principles of conservation biology.)
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 622.
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it does not translate into a management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete 
s i t u a t i o n . T h e  fact that the Forest Service had not fully considered conservation 
biology and its interpretation o f island biogeography theory was not a violation o f 
NEPA, the court reasoned, because it was not required to engage in a significant 
discussion o f environmental consequences o f  a science it had determined to be uncertain 
in application.^^®
But the court should not have permitted the Forest Service to discard conservation 
biology principles, and hence its “hard look” obligation, on the basis that they were 
uncertain in application. First, the court failed to recognize the importance of 
conservation biology's theories and, instead, viewed them as “mere” theories. As we 
learned in Part III, however, theories are the facts o f  science,^^' as they are "the best 
available explanation[s] left after alternatives have been rigorously tested and 
eliminated.”^̂  ̂ Moreover, courts should not demand that every scientific statement have, 
in fact, been tested before it is considered— only demand that every statement must be 
capable o f being tested.
Second, the court's uncertainty distinction is not persuasive. As the Daubert Court 
stated, “it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject o f scientific testimony must 
be “known” to a certainty; arguably there are no certainties in seience”^̂  ̂ Rather, 
“scientists accept uncertainty as a fact o f life.”^̂ '* Although many people “are 
uncomfortable unless they have positive, eternal answers, scientists come to terms with
Id. at 622; but see NOSS and COOPERRIDER, supra note 2 (Island Press, 1994). The authors 
devote an entire chapter to the application o f conservation biology principles. It is entitled “Designing 
Reserve Networks.”
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 621-22 and n.11. The Seventh Circuit cited a Ninth Circuit case. Marble 
Mountain, for this proposition. In that case, the Service had entirely ignored the question of  
maintaining a biological corridor between two wilderness areas in drafting an EIS. The court found that 
at least in Marita , the agency had looked at the principles-though it had not "discussed" them.
See King, supra note 19 at 151.
Daubert, 509 U.S, at 590.
See FUTUYAMA; supra note 12, at 163.
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"2 2 5uncertainty and mutability as a fundamental condition o f human knowiedge.
Therefore, if  uncertainty exists in most of, if  not all, sciences, then there would always be 
a measure o f uncertainty in application.
Third, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., does 
not support the court's ruling, though the court cited that case to support its deference to the 
Forest Service's decision to discard conservation biology on the basis of its uncertainty. In 
Baltimore Gas, the Supreme Court stated that “a reviewing court must remember that [when] 
the [agency] is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of 
science . . .  as opposed to simple findings o f fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its 
most deferential.”^̂® By using “generally” in its statement, however, the Court was not 
requiring deference in these situations. In fact, the Court reminded reviewing courts that, 
even in such a case, their “task is to determine whether the [agency] has considered the 
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”^̂ ’ Indeed, expertise models do not mandate judicial deference.
Notably, the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council declared that 
the difference between the arbitrary and capricious standard—the standard referred to in 
Baltimore Gas— and the reasonableness one “is not of great pragmatic consequence” and is 
difficult to discem.^^’ The reasonableness inquiry, therefore, should be seen as similar to the 
inquiry into whether an agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious.^” In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit has interpreted the Court's language in Baltimore Gas as requiring judicial deference 
to an agency's interpretation o f equivocal evidence only in the case where such an
Id. at 164 (1983).
Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1540 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 
103 (1983)).
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983).
Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1540 n.l 1 (citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of 
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (the 
Supreme Court indicated in that case that the expertise model does not mandate judicial 
deference.)
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377 n.23.
See Sunstein supra note 97 at 2105.
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interpretation is reasonable.^^'
However, the Forest Service's decision to exclude conservation biology from its final 
analysis was not reasonable, as those principles-and the scientific evidence supporting 
them -w ere reliable, relevant, and suggested that the Forest Service's methodology was 
not an effective one for maintaining biodiversity. Courts, therefore, ought to conduct a 
two-step Daubert review in these “hard look” cases for three reasons: (1) to ensure the 
agency's interpretation o f equivocal evidence was reasonable; (2) to ensure the agency 
used “high quality” science—that which is reliable and relevant—in taking a “hard look”; 
and (3) to ensure that its decision was truly informed. Thus, contrary to the court's 
conclusion in Marita, an agency's failure to meaningfully consider and discuss scientific 
evidence that is both reliable and relevant, such as that offered by the conservation 
biologists, does not comport with the rule articulated in Baltimore Gas nor with NEPA's 
“hard look” requirement.
In Marita, the plaintiffs actually suggested that the court apply the Daubert factors to 
determine whether the Forest Service's assertions were owed deference and whether 
conservation biology should have been considered in spite o f  its u n c e r t a i n t y . B u t  the 
court denied the plaintiffs’ request and stated that “while such a proposal might assure 
better documentation o f an agency's scientific decisions, we think that forcing an agency 
to make such a showing as a general rule is intrusive, undeferential, and not required. 
Yet, the Marita court did not establish that a Daubert analysis o f an agency 
determination is never appropriate. Rather, as one commentator noted, “[i]t is possible 
that as the court becomes more comfortable reviewing the methodologies by which 
private parties prove causation, courts may begin probing in greater depth those used by
Central Arizona, 990 F.2d at 1540.
Marita II, 46 F.3rd at 621-22.
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agencies.”^̂ '*
Finally, consider the rule in Marsh: when specialists express conflicting views, an 
agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions o f  its own qualified 
experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more 
persuasive?^^ The rule seems to support the Marita court's decision, for the Forest 
Service's experts had determined that island biogeography was uncertain in application 
and recommended another course o f action. But a Daubert review would force an 
agency to consider “only that evidence which is o f equal scientific reliability before [the] 
deferential stage is reached.”^̂  ̂Therefore, an agency's reliance on its expert's opinions 
would occur only if  those opinions are scientifically reliable, and, as I will 
demonstrate in Section B o f this Part, those o f the defendant's were questionable.
B. Marita and the Daubert Factors
Because the plaintiffs in Marita argued that the Forest Service was required to 
consider and apply conservation biology principles, the Sierra Club and the Forest 
Service both supported their positions by directing the trial court's attention to the 
scientific evidence developed in the administrative record. This case, therefore, 
demonstrates how a court can apply the Daubert factors not only to the defendant's 
science, but to the plaintiffs as well. In this paper, I will apply the two-step Daubert 
review to the disagreement over island biogeography
The following chart summarizes the scientific evidence the court in Marita reviewed 
to resolve this issue.
See Nicolas Targ & Elise Feldman, Courting Science: Expert Testimony after Daubert and 
Carmichael, 13 Nat. Resources & Env't 507, 512-13 (1999),
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378.
See King, supra note 19, at 157. 
at 151 (1995).
-^ /(/at 147 (1995).
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Tw n-STEP REVIEW
In Maritfl, the plaintiffs contended that the theory o f island biogeography required 
large forest reserves to be set-aside in order to preserve overall biodiversity. The defendants 
simply contended that it did not.
FIRST STEP.
Determine whether the predictions o f  island biogeography are reliable? If they are, 
they must be considered by the agency. I f  they are not, they should not be considered. 
CONTENTIONS
Forest Service 
Several small reserves will 
maintain overall biological 
diversity.
Conservation biologists 
Island biogeography suggest that 
large undisturbed areas o f forest be 
set aside in order to ensure viable 
populations o f  forest communities 
and, hence to maintain overall 
biological diversity.
DA UBERT FACTORS
(A) TESTABILITY/FALSIFIABILITY:
Forest Service
Several small reserves will 
not maintain overall biological 
diversity.
Conservation Biologists
Island biogeography does not 
require that large areas of 
undisturbed forest be set aside 
in order to maintain overall 
biological diversity.
(B) PEER REVIEW AND PUBLICATION:
Forest service Conservation Biologists
A reference to Larry Harris, 
“The Fragmented Forest.” '®*
Several studies, most o f them 
describing the effects o f habitat
239 Id. at 168-69 (1995)(asserting that “The Fragmented Forest” is a unrefereed (not a peer-reviewed
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Harris suggest that biodiversity 
can be preserved by maintaining 
several small reserves.
(C) GENERAL ACCEPTANCE:
Forest Service
No indication o f general 
acceptance was presented 
to the court.
size on gray w olf populations 
in Wisconsin.
Note: These w olf studies show 
the negative impact that 
fragmentation has on a single 
species. Although Island 
biogeography typically refers to 
the total number o f  species and 
the area affect on them, the w olf 
studies are evidence that island 
biogeography’s predictions 
apply to W isconsin’s forests.
Conservation Biologists
Thirteen experts unanimously 
agreed that diversity cannot be 
maintained without the 
maintenance o f large forest 
reserves. The experts supported 
their contention with a mountain 
o f  peer review and published 
literature.'®^
(D) RATE OF ERROR: Not applicable in this case.
SECOND STEP
Did the agency consider all and only that scientific evidence which was reliable and 
relevant before making its decision?
(A) RELEVANCE;
Both contentions are relevant, as they directly address ways to preserve 
biodiversity.
publication). Though one must acknowledge that even if  King’s assertion is correct, the publication is 
well accepted and often cited. Reed Noss even cites the work, but not for the proposition that small 
reserves are better than large ones. See Noss, Supra note 7, at 90 n.32 (1994).
Plaintiffs Statement of Reasons (SOR) 95-97, 180-85.
103 See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2, at 32.
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(B) CONSIDERED ALL AND ONLY RELIABLE AND RELEVANT EVIDENCE:
No, if  the court found that the Forest Service's contention was not 
supported by reliable scientific evidence. Yet, even if  it was supported by 
such evidence, the Forest Service would not have satisfied this second 
step if  the court determined that the Conservation Biologists' contention 
was also reliable and relevant and was not considered in the Forest 
Service's final analysis.
In Marita, both the Forest Service and the conservation biologists were able to present 
testable predictions. The Forest Service contended that several small reserves will 
maintain overall biological d i v e r s i t y T h i s  contention can be falsified by the 
observation that overall biological diversity declines when several small reserves are 
created after timber harvesting leaves a forest fragmented. The conservation biologists, 
on the other hand, contended that diversity cannot be maintained unless a meaningful 
portion o f the forests are reserved for large tracts o f relatively undisturbed forest, relying 
on the theory o f island biogegraphy for support.^"^ This contention can be falsified by the 
observation that large blocks o f relatively undisturbed habitat are not necessary to 
maintain biodiversity. Both parties, therefore, present testable predictions.
The second criterion, peer review and publication, indicated a difference in the 
scientific evidence used to support each party’s contention. The conservation biologists 
used a number o f peer-reviewed articles documenting the effects o f habitat size on gray 
wolf populations in Wisconsin to support their contention. Although these studies 
document the negative impact fragmentation has on a single species, they support island 
biogeography's prediction that the size o f a habitat patch and its distance from other 
patches—consisting o f  similar habitat—affects the total number o f species that can exist in 
those areas (see relevancy discussion below). The scientific evidence used to support 
plaintiff s contention, therefore, was peer reviewed and published and could satisfy this 
criterion.
- ■ Marita /, 843 F.Supp. at 1539.
Marita /, 843 F.Supp, at 1538.
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The Forest Service, however, relied upon a single p u b l i c a t i o n , w h i c h  one 
commentator asserted was not peer reviewed, to support its contention.^'^^ One must 
acknowledge, however, that Larry Harris’ “The Fragmented Forest” is often cited by 
reputable scientists, though not for its proposition that biodiversity can be maintained 
through use o f small reserves.^''^ Yet, the Forest Service's contention was supported by 
other articles that had been peer reviewed. Notably, the Single Large or Several Small 
(SLOSS) debate produced peer-reviewed articles indicating that biodiversity could be 
maintained with small reserves,^"*^ but the Forest Service chose instead to rely on Larry 
Harris' publication and failed to bring the others to the court's attention.^'** A court ought 
to consider facts such as these when deciding whether a contention is reliable, and use the 
other Daubert factors to help guide it in its reliability determination.
The third criterion, general acceptance, indicates a distinct difference between the two 
contentions. The conservation biologists presented the testimony o f thirteen experts, all 
o f whom unanimously agreed that diversity cannot be maintained without large forest 
reserves and pointed to several letters o f support from respected scientists in the field.
The testimony and letters indicate general acceptance. Conversely, the Forest Service 
presented no evidence to the court indicating general acceptance for its contention, for 
even at the time it issued its LRMP's, there was general agreement in the scientific 
community that large preserves were preferable to small ones. '̂*^
In sum, the conservation biologists supported their contention with evidence that 
meets all the applicable criteria o f Daubert. The Forest Service, on the other hand, 
generated a testable prediction, relied heavily on one, arguably unrefereed, publication
LARRY D. HARRIS, THE FRAGMENTED FOREST 113-15 (1984) (suggesting that biodiversity 
can be preserved by maintaining several small reserves.)
See King, supra note 19 at 168-69 (1995) (asserting that "The Fragmented Forest" is a unrefereed 
(not a peer-reviewed publication)).
See Noss, supra note 7, at 90 n.32.
See Simberloff and Abele, supra note 1, at 285-286; see also Daniel Simberloff, Review o f  theory’ 
relevant to acquiring land. Report to Florida Department of Natural Resources. Florida State 
University, Tallahassee , FL (1991); Robert May, Island Biogeography and the Design o f  Wildlife 
Preserves.” 254 NATURE Vol.254 (1975). See generally QUAMMEN, supra note 1, at 457-545.
Marita /, 843 F.Supp at 1540.
See Soule and Simberloff, supra note 2 at 32 (1986).
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for support, and offered no evidence o f general acceptance for its contention. A court 
could, therefore, reasonably conclude that the defendant’s contention was not supported 
by reliable science. In such a case, the court should then require the Forest Service to: (1) 
reconsider all that scientific evidence which is both reliable and relevant; and (2) to 
choose a methodology that is supported by such evidence. Nevertheless, the court in 
Marita deferred to the Forest Service.
If  the Marita court had applied a two-step Daubert review, it would have 
proceeded to the second step o f a Daubert review only if  it found that the Forest 
Service's contention was supported by reliable evidence. Assuming for illustrative 
purposes that the Forest Service's contention was reliable, a court would then ensure that 
the Forest Service considered all and only reliable and relevant evidence. Here the court 
would consider the relevance o f the conservation biologists’ use o f evidence 
documenting the affects o f habitat size on gray w olf populations. Because such evidence 
corroborated the conservation biologists' contention that large patches are necessary to 
maintain biodiversity, it would be relevant. Moreover, the conservation 
biologists’contention was supported by evidence that satisfied all the Daubert reliability 
criteria. Thus, even if  the Forest Service had supported its contention with reliable 
evidence, it would have failed under this second step, which ensures sciences such as 
conservation biology receive a “fair hearing” in an agency’s decision-making process.^^**
VII. Conclusion
Until courts conduct a two-step Daubert review, reliable scientific principles, such as 
those o f conservation biology, are not guaranteed a “fair hearing” in the agency decision­
making process. Such a review, however, would not require agencies to employ any 
particular scientific methodology. That policy choice would be left to the agency, so long 
as it considered all and only reliable and relevant evidence in reaching its decision.
Marita /, 843 F.Supp at 1540 (stating that the service did not directly consider principles of
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In Chevron cases, a court can conduct a Daubert review to determine whether an 
agency's interpretation o f an ambiguous statutory provision is truly reasonable, for it is 
difficult to find that a Congressional delegation o f  authority to an agency entitles that 
agency to use unreliable or irrelevant scientific evidence when deciding the correct 
course o f  action. Pilchuck demonstrates how the court has already implicitly begun to use 
a Daubert review to inquire into the reasonableness o f  such a decision. Notably, a two- 
step Daubert review is entirely consistent with Chevron as a court would not technically 
be interpreting statutory provisions by conducting such review, rather they would simply 
be requiring agencies to use reliable and relevant evidence. Even if  it did involve 
statutory interpretation, conducting such a review is consistent with Chevron's 
reasonableness requirement. Moreover, if  one were to suggest that a two-step Daubert 
review is not consistent with Chevron, such a review is supported by other interpretive 
norms that displace Chevron.
In NFMA diversity cases, a court ought to conduct a Daubert review when 
plaintiffs specifically challenge the assumptions underlying a scientific methodology. As 
noted in the Inland Empire discussion, the defendant's assumption—maintaining more 
acreage of habitat than is necessary for survival would in fact assure a species’ survival- 
failed to take into account certain conservation biology principles. Yet, the court deferred to 
the Forest Service and held that the “service is entitled to rely on reasonable assumptions in 
its environmental analyses,” though the court did not inquire into the reasonableness of the 
assumption. If the court had, it would have discovered that the Forest Service's methodology 
necessarily assumed a result that was not based on consideration of all reliable and relevant 
scientific evidence. In fact, the court would have discovered that conservation biology 
undermined the scientific basis for the Forest Service's assumption. In such a case, a court 
ought to require the Forest Service to; (1 ) reconsider all that scientific evidence which is both
conservation biology).
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reliable and relevant; and (2) to choose a methodology that is supported by such evidence.
Finally, in NEPA “hard look” cases, a court ought to also conduct a Daubert review. The 
CEQ, passed regulations to foster informed decision making, requiring that scientific 
evidence used in NEPA documents be o f “high quality.” CEQ, was hopeful these 
requirements would help agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of 
their proposed actions. Yet, as demonstrated in the Marita discussion, the Forest Service 
does not always take the requisite “hard look” or employ scientific methodologies that are 
scientifically reliable. In these cases, I suggest that courts conduct a two-step Daubert review 
for three reasons: (1) to ensure the agency's interpretation of equivocal evidence was 
reasonable; (2) to ensure the agency used “high quality” science—that which is reliable and 
relevant—in taking a “hard look”; and (3) to ensure that its decision was truly informed.
In sum, we must raise the standards by which agencies make decisions that determine the 
fate of biological communities. Reliable and relevant scientific evidence must become the 
foundation for environmental management decisions. Species are depending on us. The 
law must evolve to recognize this responsibility.
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